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Dominance desires predicting conspiracy beliefs and Trump support in the 2016 US 1 
election. 2 
  3 
Since 2016 terms such as “post-truth” or “alternative facts” have been symbolic for the 4 
spread of evidence-absent political discourse. As decision-making absent actual facts is 5 
dangerous, it is important to determine why people believe in conspiracies such as “large scale 6 
voter fraud” (Trump, 2016a). In this study we showed that desires to dominate/fears of being 7 
dominated (i.e., dominance motive) predicted conspiracy beliefs as voters faced challenges to 8 
election-relevant cognitions (e.g., “we will win”; “we are superior”). We explained this by 9 
dominance motives giving value to challenged election cognitions which would increase 10 
individuals’ desires to alleviate this challenge (i.e., by adopting conspiracy beliefs). In line with 11 
this we found Trump voters facing defeat pre-election believed more in election conspiracies 12 
as a function of their dominance motive. This effect disappeared post-election, as by Trump’s 13 
victory such challenges were arguably attenuated. Moreover, Clinton voters’ dominance motive 14 
positively, though weakly, predicted believing in election conspiracies after the election. 15 
Exploratory analyses showed mediating effects of conspiracy belief on the relationship between 16 
dominance motives and preferring Trump over Clinton. This research complements previous 17 
findings showing personality characteristics predicting conspiracy beliefs and, by using actual 18 
conspiracy beliefs in a real-life event, add to their ecological validity.  19 
Keywords: dominance motive; conspiracy belief; US election; Trump; Clinton.   20 
“Of course there is large scale voter fraud happening on and before election day. Why 21 
do Republican leaders deny what is going on? So naive!” (Trump, 2016a) 22 
In 2016, US presidential candidate Trump tweeted several such statements suggesting 23 
large scale voter fraud, rigged pre-election polls, or complaining about unfair media coverage 24 
(e.g., Trump, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d). Contra overwhelming evidence (e.g., Bump, 2016; 25 
Patterson, 2016), a majority of Trump’s voters believed these conspiracies (Tamman, 2016). 26 
As deliberately irrational/evidence-absent politics hinders informed decisions, understanding 27 
why people believe in such conspiracies is vital (cf. Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016). Previous 28 
studies have linked conspiracy beliefs to situational variables (e.g., manipulations of actors’ 29 
morality; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013) or personality characteristics (e.g., exaggerated pride 30 
in one’s in-group; e.g., Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec De Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016). Here, 31 
we wanted to add to the ecological validity of such findings by utilising authentic conspiracy 32 
beliefs in a real-life event (i.e., the 2016 US election). Moreover, as motives/desires strongly 33 
reflect how much people value certain beliefs/actions (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008), 34 
we investigated the predictive power of the dominance motive (DM). 35 
Multiple theories hold that challenges to expected outcomes (e.g., the expectation to 36 
win; Kruglanski et al., 2018), group-identity (e.g., being the superior group/not being the losers; 37 
Cichocka et al., 2016), or certainty of world view (e.g., most Americans are like me; van 38 
Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013) generate affectively negative motivation to reduce them (see also 39 
cognitive dissonance theory; Festinger, 1957). Despite their differences, each theory presumes 40 
the interplay of two components predicting reduction-motivation: the degree of perceived 41 
challenge and the value of the expected outcome/group identity/world view (i.e., cognitions; 42 
Festinger, 1957). Leading up to the election, Trump voters likely felt strongly challenged on all 43 
these fronts, given that most polls predicted a Clinton victory, the campaign was marked by a 44 
strong ‘us-against-them’ mentality on both sides, and fears of forced adherence to opponents’ 45 
agendas clashed with desires to gain control of one’s destiny/country (e.g. MacWilliams, 2016; 46 
Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2016). Given the hostile election environment, we 47 
propose DM will predict how much individuals valued these election-relevant cognitions 48 
(Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; Suessenbach, Loughnan, Schönbrodt, & Moore, 2019). 49 
This motive represents a desire to coerce others into submission/obedience and a fear of being 50 
so coerced; it relates to retaliatory behaviour in dictator games, social dominance orientation 51 
(i.e., beliefs that one’s ingroup should be superior to outgroups, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 52 
Malle, 1994), and antagonistic self-protection (i.e., narcissistic rivalry; Back et al., 2013; 53 
Suessenbach et al., 2019). Along with desires to be voluntarily respected/admired (prestige) 54 
and to take responsibility in and for one’s group (leadership), it constitutes one of three 55 
components of a broad desire for social power (Suessenbach et al., 2019). In sum, we propose 56 
DM as a proxy for the value of situationally challenged election-relevant cognitions, thus 57 
predicting reduction-seeking behaviour. 58 
According to cognitive dissonance theory, one powerful reduction mechanism is 59 
negating challenging information (i.e., subtracting dissonant cognitions; Festinger, 1957). This 60 
can be achieved by giving credence to election conspiracies (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016; 61 
Kruglanski et al., 2018; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013) as to (pre-emptively) adjust outcomes 62 
(i.e., we haven’t really lost; we were cheated), group-identity (i.e., we are still great; the other 63 
side was unfair), or world view (i.e., most Americans are like me; the statistics are rigged). 64 
Hence, just before the election we predicted a positive relationship between Trump voters’ DM 65 
and their beliefs in election conspiracies (BEC; hypothesis 1). Just after the election we 66 
predicted a decline, possibly a reversed, relationship between the winning (Trump) voters’ DM 67 
and BEC, as the challenge should have been dissolved (hypothesis 2). Similarly, we predicted 68 
a positive relationship between DM and BEC in the losing (Clinton) voters (hypothesis 3). 69 
Finally, we explored how differences among voters in dominance, prestige, and leadership 70 




Pre-election cohort size was based on a power analysis indicating about n = 250 75 
participants necessary to detect a small to medium mean difference of d = .30 in DoPL motives 76 
(see similar effect sizes in Choma & Hanoch, 2017). Post-election cohort N was determined by 77 
the maximum sample size given our budget. We resampled data for participants who failed our 78 
attention checking question, excluding npre-election = 5 and npost-election = 18 participants; resulting 79 
in npre-election = 250 (102 females, Mage = 32.51, SDage = 11.46) and npost-election = 500 (230 females, 80 
Mage = 32.77, SDage = 12.18). Among males we sampled about twice as many Clinton as Trump 81 
voters. Among females we sampled about four times as many Clinton as Trump voters. All 82 
samples were collected via www.prolific.ac, restricted to US American registered voters who 83 
reported the intention to vote or had voted for either Trump or Clinton. Participants were 84 
reimbursed with $0.40 for their participation in any one study. Sample sizes, hypotheses, and 85 
statistical models were preregistered (https://osf.io/nz6qt/); complete dataset and reproducible 86 
R script can be found here: https://osf.io/s6u6m/. This study received the approval of the local 87 
research ethic committee. 88 
 89 
Material 90 
Each DoPL motive was measured with 4 items (e.g., DM: “When people challenge me 91 
I want to put them down hard”; Suessenbach et al., 2019). BEC was measured as agreement 92 
with three items based on accusations made by Trump (e.g., Trump, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 93 
2016d; see Items 1 to 3 in Table 1). We also measured agreement to three additional excuses 94 
for losing an election not explicitly offered by Trump but only included one of these items in 95 
our analysis (see Item 4 in Table 1).1 All items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale from 96 
“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. 97 
(Insert Table 1 here) 98 
 99 
Procedure 100 
The pre-election/post-election sample was collected one and two days before/after the 101 
US election on the 8th of November 2016 and introduced as a study on personality, voting 102 
preferences, and opinions regarding the 2016 US election. Participants were registered voters 103 
for the 2016 US election with the intention to vote (pre-election) or had already voted (pre- and 104 
post-election) for either Trump or Clinton. After checking these requirements and obtaining 105 
participants’ informed consent, we asked for intention/vote (pre-election) or vote (post-106 
election). Following this, participants filled in the 12 DoPL items, three items regarding BEC, 107 
and three additional excuses followed by standard demographic questions (i.e., age, gender, 108 
occupation). Participants were not fully debriefed pre-election, only post-election, in case some 109 
participated in both parts. We gave all participants an email address for any questions.  110 
 111 
Results 112 
Belief in election conspiracies 113 
(Insert Table 2 here) 114 
Cronbach’s αs were sufficient across all measures, .70 < αs < .87, however, the 115 
additional excuse item did not correlate with BEC, r(748) = -.09, p = .056 (see Table 2). We 116 
conducted a preregistered linear regression of BEC on DoPL motives, dummy coded voting 117 
preference (Trump = 0), dummy-coded study part (pre-election = 0), and all possible 118 
interactions between DM, voting preference, and study part (Figure 1). Note, that including 119 
prestige and leadership motives in these models controlled for shared/non-specific hope to gain 120 
power (Suessenbach et al., 2019). Thus, all DM effects reported here refer to residualised effects 121 
(Vize, Collison, Miller, & Lynam, 2018); nonetheless, results were essentially equivalent when 122 
removing prestige and leadership motives (see Figure A1, Tables A1 & A2 in Appendix). BEC 123 
was positively related to DM for Trump voters pre-election, β = 0.24, t = 2.93, p = .004 124 
(hypothesis 1). Post-election, this relationship significantly weakened, β = -0.21, t = -2.04, p = 125 
.042 (interaction term; hypothesis 2), to essentially 0 (β = 0.24 – 0.21 = 0.03) but did not reverse. 126 
Independent of study part and voting preference, the prestige motive was positively, β = 0.11, t 127 
= 3.18, p = .002, and the leadership motive negatively related to BEC, β = -0.08, t = -2.32, p = 128 
.021. Trump voters had generally higher BEC than Clinton voters pre-election, β = -1.41, t = -129 
11.90, p < .001. This difference remained, though weaker, post-election, β = 0.32, t = 2.22, p = 130 
.027.   131 
Testing hypothesis 3, we re-coded voting preference (Clinton = 0) and study part (post-132 
election = 0) and repeated our analysis, demonstrating that DM was positively related to BEC 133 
in Clinton voters after the election, β = 0.11, t = 2.15, p = .032. Though this relationship was 134 
descriptively smaller pre vs post-election, there was no significant difference in pre-post 135 
regression slopes, β = -0.04, t = -0.51, p = .607. 136 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 137 
Analysis of additional excuse item #4 showed Trump voters’ DM did not relate to beliefs 138 
that Clinton’s child had a more positive impact than Trump’s children pre-election, β = -0.18, t 139 
= -1.80, p = .072 (hypothesis 1). Nonetheless, in line with our predictions (hypothesis 3), DM 140 
was significantly positively related to the corresponding belief in Clinton voters post-election, 141 
β = 0.14, t = 2.44, p = .015. Neither of these two relationships differed pre- and post-election 142 
(ps > .080; hypothesis 2). However, given little reliability of results concerning such single 143 
items (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013), we will not further interpret these results. 144 
 145 
Power motives and voting for Trump or Clinton 146 
Three pre-registered Bonferroni corrected 2(gender: male vs female)*2(voting 147 
preference: Trump vs Clinton) ANOVAs with the DoPL motives as DVs assessed pre-election 148 
differences in social power motives  between Trump and Clinton voters, controlling for gender. 149 
On average males had higher DM than females (Mmales = 10.09 vs Mfemales = 8.03), F(1, 246) = 150 
8.76, p = .010, η2G = .03, as did Trump voters (M = 10.71) compared to Clinton voters (M = 151 
8.62), F(1, 246) = 7.99, p = .015, η2G = .03. There was no interaction (p = 1). Neither prestige 152 
nor leadership motives significantly differed for males vs females, Trump vs Clinton voters, or 153 
any combination of these variables. Results remained essentially unchanged when using only 154 
unique variance of each DoPL motive as DVs (i.e., using the residuals from regressing each 155 
DoPL motive on the respective other two). 156 
Finally, in an exploratory mediation model based on pre-election data, we investigated 157 
whether voters’ BEC explained the relationship between DM and voting for Trump over 158 
Clinton. The positive relationship between voters’ DM and their probability to vote for Trump 159 
over Clinton, b = 0.11, p < .001, was fully mediated by BEC, b = -0.01, p = .725 (see Figure 2). 160 
Thus, desire to dominate others and belief in false conspiracies combined to predict preference 161 
for Trump. 162 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 163 
Discussion 164 
We correctly predicted Trump voters facing defeat pre-election endorsed beliefs in false 165 
conspiracies as a function of their DM. This effect disappeared post-election, since Trump’s 166 
victory arguably attenuated previous challenges to election-relevant cognitions (e.g., the 167 
expectation to win; the belief that one’s in-group is superior). Clinton voters’ DM positively 168 
predicted BEC post-election, though weakly and only descriptively stronger than pre-election. 169 
These findings support the idea that DM predicts individuals valuing election-relevant 170 
cognitions and negating factual information (i.e., adopt conspiracy beliefs) which challenge 171 
these (cf. Festinger, 1957). As such they extend our knowledge of DMs and could prove 172 
valuable in predicting BEC in the future. By utilising authentic BEC in a real-life scenario these 173 
findings complement more controlled studies using hypothetical scenarios (e.g., van Prooijen 174 
& Jostmann, 2013), showing that challenging valued cognitions can produce conspiracy beliefs 175 
in meaningful natural settings. 176 
Exploratory analyses showed higher DMs for Trump voters and males, relative to 177 
Clinton voters and females. Trump potentially attracted more dominance-driven voters, as his 178 
ideas were more strongly based on  dominance mechanisms (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 179 
Suessenbach et al., 2019) - forcing deference to the US from other states, or certain sub-groups’ 180 
superiority over others (e.g., “Caucasian” & “Males” over “Mexicans”; Degani, 2016; 181 
Filipovic, 2016). To some extent these higher DMs might have benefitted Trump as they 182 
predicted higher BEC which in turn predicted a higher probability to vote Trump. Finally, 183 
independent from pre/post-election assessment and voting preference, residualised prestige and 184 
leadership motives related to BEC positively and negatively, respectively. As with or without 185 
controlling for these shared social power influences DM showed equivalent results when 186 
predicting BEC and given that we had no hypotheses for prestige and leadership we will not 187 
further interpret these results. 188 
Study limitations include BEC items only being based on Trump’s statements (although 189 
we matched phrasings to voter intention). Thus, we can neither compare Trump and Clinton 190 
voters’ general BEC nor its relationship with DM. Similarly, the interpretation of Trump 191 
benefitting from dominance-driven voters’ conspiracy endorsements is limited to these specific 192 
conspiracies. Note that for this study we could not find authentic conspiracies of Clinton voters 193 
(even Russian election meddling seemed more accurate than conspiracy; e.g., Entous, 194 
Nakashima, & Miller, 2016); nonetheless, if possible, future studies should assess a wider range 195 
of actual conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, we did not assess the impact of individual election-196 
relevant cognitions but assumed all were challenged. Differentiating them would have been 197 
difficult in a naturalistic setting; nonetheless, future studies could attempt to develop items more 198 
clearly phrased towards certain cognitions or create controlled lab conditions which challenge 199 
specific cognitions. Finally, although the process from challenging information to adopting 200 
conspiracy beliefs is straight forward to assume we did not measure its individual steps. Future 201 
studies could improve on this by using more suitable methods; for example, researchers could 202 
measure negative affect with EMG (cf. Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003) after experimentally 203 
challenging valued cognitions. This negative affect should then be reduced in individuals 204 
adopting conspiracy beliefs.   205 
Saturated by “post-truth” and “alternative facts” we must determine factors relating to 206 
endorsing evidence-absent opinions. We used such statements from Trump and found DM 207 
predicted Trump voters’ BEC prior to potential defeat in, and Clinton voters’ after defeat 208 
following, the 2016 US election. Beliefs decoupled from reality are especially dangerous in the 209 
political sphere. Our research suggests that lowering fears of being dominated by the other party 210 
may reduce self-protective BECs. This could be achieved, for example, by mutually enforced 211 
stricter civility norms in politics.   212 
Appendix 213 
(Insert Figure A1 here) 214 
(Insert Table A1 here) 215 
(Insert Table A2 here) 216 
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  299 
Tables 300 
Table 1. Depicting 3 items measuring belief in election conspiracies offered by Trump 301 
(Items 1 to 3) as well as one additional excuse for losing the election not offered by Trump. 302 
Wording was adapted to match participant’s voting preference (i.e., we replaced “Donald 303 
Trump” with “Hillary Clinton” and vice versa; Curly brackets) and study part (i.e., we used the 304 
present tense, pre-election, and the past tense post-election; Squared brackets).  305 
# Category Item wording 
1 Rigged pre-
election polls 
The pre-election polls are {were} rigged against Donald Trump 
[Hillary Clinton] in a way that they are {were} showing more voters 
in favour of Hillary Clinton [Donald Trump] than there actually are 
{were}. 
2 Voter fraud At this year’s election, more than 2% of votes in favour of Hillary 
Clinton [Donald Trump] will actually be {have actually been} invalid 
due to voter fraud but will be {have been} counted towards the valid 
votes for Hillary Clinton [Donald Trump]. 
3 Unfair media 
coverage 
The portrayal of Donald Trump [Hillary Clinton] in the media has 






Hillary Clinton’s child [Donald Trump’s children] had a lot more 




Table 2. Correlations across pre- and post-election as well as across Trump and Clinton 308 
voters for DoPL motives and sum scored belief in election conspiracies (BEC) as well as one 309 
additional excuse item for losing the election (Add. item). Mean and [SD] in diagonal.  310 
 
Dominance Prestige Leadership BEC Add. item 
Dominance 9.21 [4.00]     
Prestige .30*** 14.91 [3.61]    
Leadership .29*** .40*** 14.48 [4.44]   
BEC .23*** .10* .07 9.54 [3.57] 
 
Add. item .06 .12** -.06 -.09 2.62 [1.35] 
Cronbach’s α .84 .78 .87 .70 - 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; after Bonferroni-Holm correction.  311 
 312 
 313 
Table A1. Belief in election conspiracies (BEC) predicted by dominance motive, voting 314 
preference (Trump = 0), study part (pre-election = 0) and any interaction between these 315 
variables. 316 
 β SE t p 
Intercept 0.97 0.10 9.64 <.001 
Dominance 0.25 0.08 3.08 .002 
Voting preference -1.37 0.12 -11.56 <.001 
Study part -0.21 0.12 -1.70 .090 
Voting preference*study part 0.32 0.15 2.17 .030 
Dominance*voting preference -0.18 0.11 -1.75 .081 
Dominance*study part -0.20 0.10 -1.95 .026o 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.25 0.13 1.90 .057 
o one-tailed test. 317 
 318 
Table A2. BEC predicted by dominance motive, voting preference (Clinton = 0), study 319 
part (post-election = 0) and any interaction between these variables. 320 
 
β SE t p 
Intercept -0.30 0.04 -6.76 <.001 
Dominance 0.12 0.05 2.46 .014 
Voting preference 1.05 0.09 12.27 <.001 
Study part -0.11 0.08 -1.39 .166 
Voting preference*study part 0.32 0.15 2.17 .030 
Dominance*voting preference -0.07 0.08 -0.85 .397 
Dominance*study part -0.05 0.08 -0.60 .547 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.25 0.13 1.90 .057 
 321 
  322 
Figures 323 
 324 
Figure 1. Belief in election conspiracies (BEC) predicted by dominance motive, voting 325 
preference, and study part; controlling for shared influences of the prestige and leadership 326 
motive. BECs for both Trump voters, pre-election, and Clinton voters, post-election, were 327 
significantly and positively related to the dominance motive (hypothesis 1 & 3, respectively). 328 
Moreover, the relationship between BEC and the dominance motive in Trump voters was 329 




Figure 2. Simple mediation model showing that, pre-election, the positive relationship 334 
between voters’ dominance motives (latent variable) and the probability to vote for Donald 335 
Trump over Hillary Clinton (measured variable; linked through logistic link function) was 336 
completely mediated by voters’ beliefs in election conspiracies (latent variable).  337 
 338 
  339 
 340 
Figure A1. Belief in election conspiracies (BEC) predicted by dominance motive, voting 341 
preference, and study part; not controlling for shared influences of the prestige and leadership 342 
motive.  343 
 344 
 345 
  346 
Footnotes 347 
1) We removed items #5 (“As a woman Hillary Clinton has an advantage as most US 348 
voters would vote for any female presidential candidate.”) and #6 (“It doesn’t matter what kind 349 
of personalities presidential candidates have, the candidate with more campaign funds always 350 
wins.”) as they were tailored to the specific event of Trump losing the election. Stronger belief 351 
that a woman (Item #5) or the candidate with more campaign funds (Item #6) has an unfair 352 
advantage does not represent an excuse for a defeat for Clinton voters, as their candidate was 353 
female and she also was the candidate with more campaign funds (Narayanswamy, Cameron, 354 
& Gold, 2016). 355 
 356 
